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"I ain't got no money, honey," wailed the Big Bopper 
during the rock era of the 1950s and 1960s. Everyone 
within hearing range (and that was most everyone) knew 
what the Big Bopper was saying—everyone, that is, except 
economists, who would have preferred a much less poetic 
statement like "I ain't got no assets which act as or can be 
easily converted into a medium of exchange, honey." 
At the Federal Reserve, which assets fit that descrip-
tion of money was fairly clear at the time of the Big Bopper. 
They were two: cash because of its acceptability and legal 
tender status and demand deposits because of their check-
ability (the ability to write demand drafts on them). Both of 
these assets were generally acceptable for transaction 
purposes. 
But in the 1970s the financial instruments that were 
potentially acceptable as a medium of exchange began to 
expand dramatically. Due in large part to prolonged infla-
tion, nominal interest rates rose to unprecedented levels 
and stimulated the creation of assets that were alternatives 
to the zero-interest demand deposit accounts. One of these 
new assets was the money market mutual fund (MMMF). 
MMMFs had features which made it hard to tell 
whether the public would use them primarily to make 
payments or to save. They were checkable like demand 
deposit accounts, and in many cases an unlimited number 
of checks could be written on these new accounts with 
negligible incremental cost. But they were also like savings 
accounts, since—unlike demand deposits—they earned 
interest at nearly competitive market rates. So MMMFs, 
in a sense, dominated demand deposits. There were, 
however, some constraints on the MMMF accounts 
which demand deposits did not share. They typically 
required a minimum check size on the order of $500 and a 
substantial minimum balance. Moreover, they were not 
federally insured. 
Whether MMMFs were used for transactions or for 
savings became important to the Fed once the extreme 
popularity of these assets became clear. In November 
1973, balances in MMMF accounts totaled only $0.1 
billion. By December 1977, that total had reached $2.4 
billion; by December 1980, it was $61.4 billion; and in 
1982 it reached $182.2 billion. Because of financial 
deregulation actions allowing commercial banks and thrift 
institutions to offer competitive deposit instruments, the 
balances in MMMFs dropped to $138.0 billion in 1983. 
But by most anyone's standards, MMMFs emerged as 
important financial assets. 
Their rapid growth forced the Federal Reserve to 
decide whether these assets should be counted for mone-
tary policymaking purposes as part of its primary defini-
tion of money (Ml) that consists of assets that are actively 
used for transaction purposes. A study by the staff of the 
Fed's Board of Governors concluded that only a minor 
portion (from 1 to 3 percent) of the balances of these assets 
were used that way (Moran and Furlong, undated). In light 
of such empirical evidence, the Federal Reserve chose to 
exclude MMMFs from the Ml definition of money. 
This decision was important because in recent years 
the Fed has frequently based its tactical monetary policy 
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3 actions on the movement of this monetary aggregate. 
When Ml has grown more rapidly (or slowly) than is 
consistent with the nation's goals for output, prices, and 
other measures of economic activity, bank reserves have 
been generally restricted (or expanded) from what they 
otherwise would be, and financial market participants tend 
to describe policy as tightening (or loosening). Had the 
Fed chosen to include MMMFs in Ml, its policy actions 
and the path of the U.S. economy over the past several 
years could have been quite different. If MMMFs had 
been counted as part of Ml, then from 1977 to 1982 the 
growth rate of transaction money would have been 14.3 
percent per year rather than 7.3 percent, given the actual 
increase in MMMFs. This could have induced a tighten-
ing in monetary policy even though there were two 
recessions during this period. Similarly, because balances 
at MMMFs fell in 1983 due to regulatory changes, had 
MMMFs been included that year the growth rate of 
transaction money would have been zero instead of 9.0 
percent. This could have induced a more expansionary 
policy even though the economy was growing at a brisk 
pace. 
Despite the Fed study, it is conceivable that some 
portion of MMMF balances are being used for transac-
tions and so should be counted in Ml. The Fed's study 
might have missed that portion because it examined the 
use of a limited number of accounts at a number of funds 
during a very short period of time—a reasonable ap-
proach, but not a thorough one. In this new study, we try to 
isolate the transaction portion of MMMF balances by 
examining a much more detailed sample of many more 
accounts at just one MMMF over a much longer period of 
time. This new perspective, however, produces old con-
clusions. Our study's results complement the Board 
study's and support the Fed's decision to exclude all 
MMMF accounts from Ml. 
Why We Suspected Misclassification 
MMMFs were not classified in the money taxonomy as 
assets that are used actively for transaction purposes 
because empirical data indicated that they were not ac-
tually used that way by consumers and businesses. How-
ever, the fact that MMMFs earn attractive interest rates 
while providing extensive check writing privileges raises 
the possibility that there may be a significant portion of 
MMMFs that are being used for transaction purposes, but 
that the available empirical data are simply not providing 
the proper detail to uncover this portion. 
In classifying assets on the money spectrum—from 
assets which are used actively (like cash) for transaction 
purposes to those which are not a practical means of pay-
ment (like a home)—Ml, or its components, can be used 
as a standard of comparison. The Fed has chosen to define 
Ml as consisting essentially of coins and currency plus 
checkable deposits. This definition is meant to capture 
those assets that can be conveniently used for transaction 
purposes. Included among the components of Ml are 
several types of assets which are those most easily 
identifiable as assets the public uses mainly to make 
payments: (1) coins and currency, which are the most 
widely accepted media of exchange since, if for no other 
reason, they are legal tender; (2) demand deposits, which 
are undoubtedly a widely used means of payment for 
consumers and all sorts of businesses; and (3) ATS-NOW 
accounts, which are also clearly used primarily to make 
payments, primarily by consumers. 
But not all checkable accounts are included in Ml. 
Money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), even though 
checkable, are not in Ml. The transaction activity in these 
accounts has been deemed to be so much different from 
that in the components of Ml that MMDAs are counted 
only in higher level definitions of money, such as M2. And 
it is not surprising that these accounts are not used actively 
for transaction purposes, since they typically require 
relatively large minimum account balances and charge 
rather expensive penalty fees if more than three checks per 
month are written. 
As noted earlier, MMMFs also have constraints which 
might limit their use as transaction accounts. Whether 
these constraints are severe enough to make the public use 
MMMFs more like savings accounts than checking 
accounts is an empirical question. 
Also as noted earlier, the staff of the Fed's Board of 
Governors has studied this question. It studied transac-
tions during March 1982 in 150 accounts at each of 60 
MMMFs and found that, relative to Ml and its major 
components, MMMFs are not used actively for transac-
tion purposes. 
But because of the Board's particular sample, its study 
may have missed transaction activity in some large portion 
of the MMMFs. It may have missed transaction activity in 
accounts that are used heavily at times other than the 
month of March or activity that is generated by a subset of 
the MMMF shareholders that might not be apparent with 
a sample of only 150 accounts per fund. 
So given the check writing features of the MMMFs, 
their attractive interest rates, and the doubts left by the 
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Board's study, it seems reasonable to suspect that some 
large portion of MMMFs are being used for transaction 
purposes. To explore this suspicion, we examine a new 
body of data that permits us to focus on the particular 
weaknesses in the Board's study. 
Suspicion Not Confirmed 
Our study examines a large sample of accounts at a single 
MMMF over an 18-month period and thereby overcomes 
the weak points in the Board's study. However, our 
findings support the Board's conclusion that MMMFs are 
not Ml-type money. 
We examine the check writing activity from January 
1982 to June 1983 in nearly 79,000 accounts representing 
over $700 million at a single money market mutual fund. 
This fund has shareholders representing most of the 50 
states and is representative of other MMMFs in terms of 
its operating characteristics, such as minimum balance, 
minimum check size, and cost of writing a check. But we 
have no way of knowing whether or not this fund is 
representative of other funds in terms of the distribution of 
shareholder behavior characteristics regarding check 
writing activity. 
Our large sample over an 18-month period permits a 
disaggregation of the shareholders into a large number of 
classes, each containing a large number of accounts, and 
we can thereby search for a well-defined subset of the 
shareholders who are heavily using the check writing 
privilege of the fund, as though the fund were a transaction 
account. We primarily compare the check writing be-
havior of our sample of accounts to that of MMDAs and 
ATS-NOW accounts rather than that of demand deposit 
accounts. Demand deposit accounts are used heavily by 
financial firms making purely financial transactions, but 
there are no financial firms in our sample of accounts, so 
we focus on MMDAs and ATS-NOW accounts, which 
are used primarily by consumers. 
We calculate two types of measures of transaction 
activity at our fund. The most direct measure of that 
activity might be the number of checks written on 
accounts—the more checks written, presumably, the more 
those accounts are being used primarily for spending 
rather than saving. + That rather crude measure is not 
adequate to determine a high degree of transaction 
activity, however, because it does not take account of the 
size of the checks written. An account with a large number 
of checks written on it might actually be being held 
primarily as an investment rather than a transaction 
account if those checks are small compared to the account 
balance. To take account of that possibility, therefore, we 
also calculate for our accounts what has become the 
traditional measure of transaction activity: velocity, or 
turnover rate. Arithmetically this is calculated as the 
annual dollar value of transactions generated by an asset 
divided by the average dollar balance in the asset. 
Conceptually it represents the number of times an individ-
ual dollar flows through or is spent from the asset. A high 
turnover rate thus usually indicates a high degree of 
transaction activity; a low turnover rate, a low degree. This 
distinction has been reflected in the Fed's money defini-
tions, with Ml assets having higher turnover than M2 or 
M3 assets. For example, in 1983, the turnover rates of 
demand deposits, ATS-NOW accounts, and MMDAs 
were, respectively, 376.1, 15.4, and 2.8. 
Classification of the MMMF accounts by neither turn-
over nor number of checks written produces a significant 
subset of fund balances that are used for transaction 
purposes like Ml balances. 
As is clear in Table 1, the mean turnover rate of the 
accounts in our sample is only slightly higher than 3, about 
the same order of magnitude as the turnover rate of 
MMDAs—which are not counted in M1—and well below 
the 15.4 of ATS-NOW accounts—which are included in 
Ml. In Table 1 this average for all accounts is also 
decomposed into accounts owned by households and 
those owned by corporations, and the results are not 
substantially different under this disaggregation. Similarly, 
the mean number of checks written on these accounts per 
year is only slightly higher than 3, well below the annual 
rate of 18 checks written on MMDAs (Trans Data 
Corporation 1984, p. 2). These fund averages are not 
substantially different from the results produced by the 
Board's study. However, because of the detail available in 
the sample of accounts at our single fund, an appropriate 
decomposition of the accounts could produce a significant 
subset of them that are being used for transaction purposes 
like some of the components of Ml. 
The results of our decomposition are shown in Tables 2 
and 3. In Table 2 we show an ordering of all 78,613 
accounts according to their turnover rate over the 18-
month sample period. There clearly are some accounts 
which are being used actively; that is, they have turnover 
t It might be argued that we are underestimating the transaction activity in 
MMMFs because we ignore redemptions by telephone, letter, or wire transfer. But 
it was our presumption that noncheck redemptions would rarely be made to third 
parties and would typically be a transfer to a demand deposit account which would 
then become the payment instrument. 
5 rates greater than 200, or of the same order of magnitude 
as demand deposits. However, if we take the ATS-NOW 
account turnover rate of 15.4 as a more appropriate 
standard of comparison, then (as shown in Table 2) only 
about 0.4 percent of all the balances in this fund are in 
accounts with a comparable turnover rate (greater than 
14). It is also interesting to note the clear negative 
correlation between turnover and the average balance in 
the account. 
Similarly, in Table 3 the accounts are ordered accord-
ing to the number of check redemptions made on an annual 
basis. Here again there is little evidence that checks are 
written actively on accounts holding large portions of the 
fund balances. Only about 4.4 percent of the fund balances 
are in accounts that have checks written on them at a rate 
of more than 1 per month; this represents only about 3.6 
percent of the accounts. In contrast, more than 70 percent 
of MMDAs, which are accounts with even lower turnover 
than ATS-NOW accounts, have 1 or 2 checks per month 
written on them. 
So there is a portion of MMMF balances that are being 
used for transaction purposes, but this portion is extremely 
small. For even if MMMFs had been counted as Ml-type 
money in our sample years in proportion to their use for 
transaction purposes (somewhere in the range of from 0.4 
to 4.4 percent), there would have been essentially no 
impact on the monetary policy decisions of the Federal 
Reserve. 
From December 1981 to December 1982, actual Ml 
grew 8.5 percent, or well above its target range of from 2.5 
to 5.5 percent. Adding even 4.4 percent of total (general 
purpose and broker/dealer) MMMF balances, and allow-
ing for the actual increase in MMMFs that occurred, 
would have raised the growth rate of this aggregate only 
0.2 percentage points to 8.7 percent—a difference that 
would not likely have affected monetary policy actions. 
Similarly, in 1983 actual Ml grew 9.0 percent, which is 
outside the target range of from 4 to 8 percent announced 
in February 1983. Augmented by 4.4 percent of MMMF 
balances, Ml would have grown 8.4 percent, or 0.6 
Table 1 
Average Measures of Transaction Activity 
in the Sample MMMF Accounts and Other Financial Assets* 



























Other Financial Assets 








n.a. = not available 
* For MMMF accounts, all measures are averages of values for individual sample accounts in the 18-month 
sample period (from January 1982 to June 1983). For other financial assets, the turnover rates are those 
reported by the Fed for 1983 and the number of checks is based on the monthly number reported in a nation-
wide survey in December 1983 and January 1984. 
tThe sample's aggregate turnover rate—one more strictly comparable to the rates for other assets—is even lower: 
(Average Size of Checks X Annual Number of Checks) + Average Daily Balance = 1.34. Note that this aggre-
gate rate is not algebraically equivalent to a simple average of the turnover in each account as reported in the 
above table. 
Sources of Data for Other Financial Assets: 
Turnover—Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
Number of Checks—Trans Data Corporation 
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Table 2 
A Breakdown of the Sample MMMF Accounts by Their Annual Turnover Rate 
in the 18-Month Sample Period 
Number and Value of Checks Account Balance 
Total  Total  Average  Total 
Annual  Number  Average  Value  Daily  Value 
Annual  Number  as % of  Size ($)  as % of  Size ($)  as % of 
Turnover  Number of  Total  Per  Sample  Per  Sample  Per  Sample 
Rate  Accounts  Number  Account  Total  Account  Total  Account  Total 
1 or Less  48,794  57,884  .9  27.98  1,331  20.40  10,105  68.48 
1-2  14,745  65,896  3.6  31.85  4,679  31.80  8,791  18.01 
2-3  5,906  34,979  5.5  16.91  4,429  18.06  7,907  6.49 
3-4  2,898  18,313  6.6  8.85  4,616  9.57  6,626  2.67 
4-5  1,676  10,621  7.9  5.13  5,004  6.58  6,927  1.61 
5-6  966  5,865  8.4  2.83  5,281  3.58  5,812  .78 
6-7  657  3,813  9.5  1.84  5,689  2.94  6,113  .56 
7-8  446  2,073  9.7  1.00  4,853  1.22  4,901  .30 
8-9  330  1,508  10.2  .73  5,894  .97  5,371  .25 
9-10  226  964  10.4  .47  5,869  .84  5,333  .17 
10-12  298  1,402  12.6  .68  5,361  .90  4,232  .18 
12-14  209  780  12.3  .38  5,953  .51  3,633  .11 
14-16  177  519  13.9  .25  4,857  .28  4,100  .10 
16-20  228  588  14.3  .28  5,797  .89  3,582  .11 
20-25  134  336  16.3  .16  4,663  .21  2,356  .04 
25-50  302  560  15.4  .27  5,826  .53  2,360  .10 
50-100  156  253  18.3  .12  4,224  .15  1,186  .03 
100-200  103  134  17.5  .06  5,215  .11  1,503  .02 
Greater Than200  362  400  38.0  .19  5,791  .46  138  .01 
Sample Total  78,613  206,888  3.1  100.00%  $4,054  100.00%  $9,259  100.00% 
Table 3 
A Breakdown of the Sample MMMF Accounts by Their Annual Number of Checks 
in the 18-Month Sample Period 
Number and Value of Checks Account Balance 
Total  Total  Average  Total 
Annual  Number  Average  Value  Daily  Value 
Annual  Number  as % of  Size ($)  as % of  Size ($)  as % of 
Number of  Number of  Total  Per  Sample  Per  Sample  Per  Sample 
Checks  Accounts  Number  Account  Total  Account  Total  Account  Total 
2 or Fewer  45,726  25,030  .4  12.10  2,032  17.09  8,970  56.87 
2-4  14,630  47,802  2.8  23.11  3,755  24.40  8,887  18.03 
4-6  7,310  39,460  4.8  19.07  3,243  17.24  9,372  9.50 
6-8  4,013  28,828  6.9  13.93  3,222  12.50  1 0,535  5.86 
8-10  2,241  19,418  8.9  9.39  3,259  8.73  10,477  3.26 
10-12  1,826  13,945  11.0  6.74  3,152  6.28  8,1 42  2.06 
12-14  941  9,757  12.9  4.72  3,444  4.01  1 0,818  1.41 
14-16  523  6,337  14.9  3.06  2,736  2.54  11,309  .82 
16-18  375  4,820  17.0  2.33  3,020  2.13  12,012  .62 
More Than 18  1,028  11,491  33.5  5.55  3,428  5.07  11,027  1.57 
Sample Total  78,613  206,888  3.1  100.00%  $4,054  1 00.00%  $9,259  100.00°/c 
7 percentage points less—but still more than the Fed 
targeted. So in both years of our sample, adding the portion 
of MMMFs that even begin to resemble transaction 
balances would not have changed the fact that Ml was 
outside its target range and, therefore, would not likely 
have changed the Fed's policy decisions. 
Conclusion 
Given the small proportion of fund balances that apparent-
ly are used for transaction purposes—small both ab-
solutely and also in the context of monetary policy 
decisions—we conclude that, in the current state of 
technology and regulation, the Board has made the proper 
decision to exclude MMMFs from the Ml definition of 
money. This conclusion is supported by other analysis of 
these accounts that is not reported above. For example, we 
disaggregated the accounts by state of residence of the 
account holder. The distributions of turnover and number 
of check redemptions are surprisingly similar across states. 
There is no obvious difference, for example, in the way 
New York and Minnesota account holders use their 
mutual fund as a checking account. We also examined all 
the checks written on the accounts of this fund on four 
separate days. By looking at the purpose and the payee on 
each of the more than 5,000 checks, we were unable to 
detect any evidence that these accounts are being used 
primarily for transaction purposes. For example, only 
about 1 percent of the checks were payments to credit card 
companies, and at least 50 percent of identifiable drafts 
were associated with financial transactions. The only 
payment that clearly stood out in this analysis is the large 
number written for income tax payments around the April 
15 tax deadline. 
We do, however, admit to some lingering reservations. 
From the policy perspective, the emergence and expan-
sion of MMMFs and the simultaneous proliferation of 
other similar assets may have affected household demand 
deposit balance management, thereby indirectly altering 
the relation between Ml and spending. And given the 
proliferation of accounts with many similarities to demand 
deposits, we question whether it will be meaningful much 
longer to draw lines of demarcation between Ml, M2, and 
so on. Finally, we wonder (although we have no conviction 
at this point) about the manner in which payment of 
interest on demand deposits will affect desired asset 
holdings, as well as their utilization and yields. 
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